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Abstract 
Whilst there is a volume of literature mapping out the evolution, causes and implications of 
income inequality across countries, there is little in-depth evidence concerning the desire of 
populations for income equality.  This paper tackles this gap by presenting UK evidence from 
a large-scale adult population survey for 2003.  The headline result is that 75% of the UK 
adult population prefer a fairer income distribution.  Our econometric findings suggest that 
women are more likely to favour income equality than men and that better educated people 
are more tolerant of income inequality.  Only the very rich favour income inequality.  
Geography is important, with the Welsh, Scots and Northern Irish all more likely to prefer a 
more equitable income distribution.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Whilst there is a volume of literature mapping out the evolution, causes and implications of 
income inequality across countries (see for example, Alvarez-Garcia et al, 2004; Coulter et al, 
1992; EUROSTAT, 2000), there is little evidence concerning the desire of populations for 
income equality other than baseline survey statistics (Halesy, 1988; Taylor and Thomson, 
1996).  This paper tackles this gap by presenting UK evidence from a large-scale adult 
population survey for 2003.  It is particularly apposite given that the UK has experienced an 
increase in income and wealth inequality (Paxton and Dixon, 2004) compared to other EU 
member states (Alvarez-Garcia et al, 2004).   
 
Further, after a long period in which the Conservative Party (right of centre) dominated UK 
politics (1978 – 1997), since 1997 the Labour Party (traditionally left of centre) has been in 
power with a mandate to reduce poverty and social exclusion amongst the most disadvantaged 
in society.  Importantly, a reduction in income inequality, by raising the income of the poorest 
sections of society, has been, econometrically, found to raise average levels of “happiness” 
and “life-satisfaction” (Di Tella et al, 2002). 
 
To quote Taylor-Gooby (1990, p.1), “Average living standards are rising, but at the same time 
inequality between the comfortable majority and those left behind by their progress is 
becoming more marked.”  But does this matter?  One theory proposed by Inglehart (1990) 
predicts that affluence reduces support for redistribution and the provision of welfare.  This is 
based on the economists’ concept of diminishing marginal utility.  Or put another way, as a 
society becomes richer, there is less demand for additional expenditure on welfare and social 
security to top-up incomes of the poorest sections of society.  This is a bottom-up approach 
where an increasingly wealthy population reduces its demand for public goods and an income 
safety net.  An alternative theory is proposed by Esping-Anderson (1990) who suggests that a 
top-down system, where welfare institutions influence both overall levels of support for 
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welfare redistribution and the extent of social divisions over it.  This accords with Evans 
(1996, p.186), who states that, “inequality, and governments’ reactions towards it, remain key 
political issues.” 
 
So what does survey evidence tell us about historical trends in British social attitudes towards 
income inequality and redistribution?  Table 1 reports evidence from the British Social 
Attitudes Survey for 1989. 
 
Table 1 
Reasons for Poverty 
There are people who live in need: % of respondents 
Because of injustices in our society 29 
Because of laziness or lack of willpower 19 
Because it is an inevitable part of modern life 34 
Because there are unlucky 11 
  
Importantly, responses reflect ideological divisions [injustice causes poverty by political 
affiliation], rather than income level (Taylor-Gooby, 1990, p.8).  Yet when we consider the 
evidence concerning income and wealth distribution from the same survey we note that 65% 
of respondents thought that, “ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nations’ 
wealth”.  However, only 50% thought that the government should redistribute income from 
the better off to those who are less well off.  Here, we do observe an income effect, as people 
on high incomes are less likely than those on low incomes to view the current distribution of 
wealth as unfair.  Employment status was also a defining issue with the self-employed [petit 
bourgeoisie] substantially less likely to support government redistribution of income than 
waged employees.   
 
 4
Fifteen years later evidence from the same social attitudes survey showed that 85% thought 
that the gap between rich and poor was too large (Taylor and Thomson, 1996), and this figure 
has remained remarkably constant since 1989 (NCSR, 2004), even though evidence in Paxton 
and Dixon (2004) shows that in many ways Britain has become fairer in the last ten years.  
Interestingly, Evans (1996, p.186), in a cross-country study of support for welfare and 
redistribution, reports that, “the similarity between attitudes towards redistribution in Britain 
and mainland Europe is striking and quite distinct from (lower) levels in the US and 
Australia.” 
 
An interesting, and related, body of research relates to social and economic determinants of 
voting choices.  This is often, at least in the economics based literature, set in the context of 
utility maximisation where voters maximise their individual utility subject to their socio-
economic characteristics (see for example Fielding, 2000).  In his empirical study of the 1997 
UK election, Fielding extends the scope of traditional economic self-interest models of voting 
to include sociological characteristics such as party loyalty.  The general consensus appears to 
be that voting patterns not only depend upon attitudes to party political economic issues such 
as income distribution, but on liberal-authoritarian issues (Fielding, 2000; Heath et al, 1991).  
Thus our study can be seen as complementary to studies of voting behaviour.  However, many 
of the issues raised in voting models are relevant to our study of peoples’ attitudes towards 
income equality.  For example, Fielding (2000) uses six main explanatory variables to predict 
voting behaviour at the constituency level, namely: the unemployment rate; disposable 
income; occupational classification; population density; education, and; geography. 
 
Due to the nature of our survey we are able to incorporate a wider array of socio-economic 
variables in our study.  Below we list our variables and briefly discuss how they might act to 
raise or lower an individuals’ desire for more or less equality in the income distribution. 
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• Labour market status – the current labour market status of an individual may have an 
influence their desire for a fairer distribution of income.  For example, currently 
unemployed people, or those involved in non-market based work (housewives, carers 
etc), may perceive that they are excessively penalised, in an income sense, for not 
being active in the formal labour market and thus would be more likely to prefer a 
fairer distribution of income.  At the other extreme those in employment might see 
the unemployed as being lazy and undeserving of substantial welfare payments.  This 
might be particularly acute amongst small business owners (the petite bourgeoisie).  
In addition to these effects there may also be a socialisation effect if we assume that 
the unemployed, or indeed the petite bourgeoisie, are a distinct class of the general 
population. 
• Income – actual income can be viewed as having similar effects as labour market 
status in the sense that the poorest people (typically unemployed or doing non-market 
work) might favour a more equitable distribution of income.  A priori we might also 
expect that the very richest want to maintain their relative position, although Fielding 
(2000) finds the reverse to be true for voting for the Labour Party over the 
Conservatives.  He surmises that rich voters do not believe that their income will be 
substantially affected even if a left wing party is elected with a re-distributive agenda. 
• Education – in voting models, education tends to be more associated with an 
individuals positioning on libertarian issues.  Evidence suggests that more education 
is associated with voting for left of centre parties (Fielding, 2000; Heath, 1991).  
Whether this extends to economic issues such as income redistribution is difficult to 
predict a priori, particularly as individuals may change their socialisation patterns 
once they have received a university level education. 
• Geography – here we allow for geographical region to have an impact on the desire 
for a fairer income distribution via differences in socialisation patterns according to 
where an individual lives.  Econometrically this is captured by a series of regional 
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dummy variables, which allow for different intercepts for each region.  We might 
expect that people from the South of England have less desire for a fairer income 
distribution a priori. 
• Personal Characteristics – Here we are able to test for any potential impacts from a 
persons age, gender and ethnicity.  These all potentially have an impact on 
socialisation patterns.  For example, we might expect that individuals from ethnic 
minority backgrounds might be more supportive of a fairer income distribution, 
particularly as they might well have immediate, or family, experience of countries 
with extreme wealth and income inequality.  Voting patterns tend to show that ethnic 
minorities are proportionately more likely to vote for left of centre parties.  Age is 
also found to affect voting patterns with older people more aligned with right of 
centre parties.  Younger people may also be more idealistic and thus have a stronger 
desire for fairness.  Gender is more difficult to predict a priori, although it is likely 
that there are strong differences in socialisation patterns between men and women, 
which might lead to different preferences for income equality. 
 
2. Data 
 
The data we use is drawn from a telephone survey of the UK adult population stratified by 
gender, age and geographical distribution to reflect that of the general adult population.  The 
survey was conducted in June 1993, amongst 22,000 adults by IFF Research on our behalf.  
The survey collects information on personal demographics, employment, culture, social 
attitudes and income.  The specific question, which forms the basis of this research is: Do you 
prefer uniform living standards?  Responses are coded yes or no. 
 
 
3. Basic Sample Statistics 
In this section we discuss the basic characteristics of the sample in terms of how many 
individuals, with a particular characteristic (e.g male), support the statement that they would 
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prefer a uniform standard of living.  Univariate statistical tests are also conducted to highlight 
significant differences (e.g between males and females).  Full results are presented in Table 1 
in the appendices. 
 
3.1  Personal Characteristics 
Firstly, we note that females are generally more supportive of a more equal distribution of 
income.  The actual proportions of females and males are 80.1% and 70.9% respectively.  
Regarding age, no significant differences were identified, although 18-24 year olds were the 
most likely to support fairer distribution of income and over-65s the least likely.  The general 
pattern shows a fairly linear and declining relationship between age and support for fairer 
income distribution, although the largest difference is only 2.6% between the very young and 
old. 
 
 
Fig 1 
Education and Desire for Income Equality 
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Fig 1 suggests that formal education has an impact on how individuals feel about income 
inequality.  The pattern is quite clear, and shows that, the more highly educated a person is, 
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the less likely they are to support a fairer income distribution.  The difference between PhDs 
and O levels is 22.0% (57.3% compared to 79.3%).  This might imply that once individuals 
are in a better position vis a vis having the qualifications that tend to attract higher paid 
employment and provide greater opportunity, they are more than willing to accept the rewards 
associated with this, even if it means that the rest of the population is at a comparative 
disadvantage. 
 
Ethnicity is also an aspect where we observe significant differences between groups.  For 
example, people from black Caribbean ethnic roots have the highest propensity to   support a 
fairer income distribution at 86.7%.  This compares to only 53.8% of mixed race white and 
black Africans.  White Irish and Pakistani people also have higher support for income 
equality (81.6% and 81.0% respectively), whilst black Africans (71.2%) and Indians (73.6%) 
much lower levels of support. 
 
3.2  Labour Market Status 
Here we observe that those classified as inactive (carers, housewives etc) in the formal labour 
market, and students, are most likely to be supportive of a fairer income distribution (83.3% 
and 82.5% respectively).  This compares to only 70.9% of retired people.    An interesting 
feature is that the unemployed are only marginally more likely to support income equality 
(74.9%) than those in full-time employment (74.0%). 
 
There are also significant differences in terms of the nature of an individuals’ employment.  
For example, we observe that only 64.0% of managerial staff support income equality, 
compared to 77.4% of waged employees.  The self-employed fall in the middle of the two. 
 
We also collected information about entrepreneurial characteristics, for example people 
starting a new business or social enterprise or those acting as owner-managers of an 
established business or social enterprise.  Our findings are very consistent and support the 
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notion of entrepreneurs as the petite bourgeois.  Importantly, this holds even for social 
entrepreneurs.  In all cases people involved in entrepreneurial activity are less supportive of a 
fairer income distribution than those not involved. 
 
 
Fig 2 
Actual Income and Desire for Income Equality 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
9500 17500 25000 40000 75000 >100000
actual income £pa
%
 w
ith
in
 g
ro
up
Total
Male
Female
 
 
 
3.2 Income 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of our data in the context of this paper is comparing 
attitudes to income equality with actual income.  This goes straight to the heart of the 
concepts of altruism versus acting in ones self-interest.  Although the picture is not perfectly 
consistent, there is evidence that those in the very highest income groups (greater than 
£50,000 per annum) are significantly less likely to support income equality.  Taking the polar 
extremes, we observe that 77.7% of those in the poorest income group (<£4,500) support 
income equality compared to only 50.0% of those in the very highest income groups 
(>£100,000).  Broadly, we can split the income groups into three.  Those earning less than 
 10
£17,500 per annum tend to have more than 80% support for income equality.  Those earning 
between £17,500 and £50,000 per annum tend to have between 70% and 80% support for 
income equality, and those earning more than £50,000 per annum below 65% support for 
income equality.  Importantly, differences in the desire for greater equality in income between 
men and women widen as actual income increases.  In low income bands, the difference is 
only 4.3%, but this rises to 14.1% in the highest income band.  
 
 
3.3 Regional Differences 
Geography also appears to matter.  There appears to be a North – South effect with the 
notable exception of Yorkshire & Humberside.  Five regions, in descending order of support 
for income equality, namely; Northern Ireland (81.8%), Wales (79.6%), North East (78.0%), 
Scotland (77.5%), and the North West (75.8%) all have very high levels of support for a fairer 
income distribution.  This contrasts with the much lower support identified in London 
(70.8%) and the South East (67.3%).  However, there were no significant differences between 
those residing in urban or rural areas. 
 
 
4. Econometric Analysis 
In this section we econometrically investigate the fundamental determinants of an individuals 
propensity to support (or not) a fairer income distribution.  Due to the nature of the dependent 
variable (coded 1 if individual supports income equality and 0 otherwise) we use a probit 
model, which takes into account the binary response of the dependent variable. 
 
To allow more meaningful interpretation of the results generated we choose to report the 
marginal effects of the probit models.   
 
The empirical results were generated using a basic probit model with likelihood function: 
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 lnL = ∑ ωj ln Φ (xjb) + ∑ ωj ln (1- Φ (xjb)) 
 
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution.  This reflects the binary nature of the 
dependent variable that is coded 1 if the individual support income equality and 0 otherwise.  
The actual estimates reported are the marginal effects calculated around the means of the 
independent variables. 
 
If b and V are denoted as the coefficients and variance matrix then for continuous variables 
the estimates reported show; 
 
 bi* = ∂Φ(xb)/∂xi⏐x=x = f (xb) bi 
where the i’s refer to the ith element of b.  For dummy variables (our [0,1] coded variables) 
the estimates reported are for a discrete change in the respective variable from 0 to 1.  This is 
calculated by bi* = Φ(x1b) - Φ(x0b). 
 
The actual estimating equation can be expressed thus; 
Pr (=1) = Φ (β0 + βi Xi)  
 
,where X is a vector of characteristics identified below. 
 
The actual model can be written thus; 
 
Step 1: Individual Supports Income Equality= ƒ (personal demographics + labour market 
status + income + geographical region) 
  
The full models are presented in Table 2 in the appendices.  Three different models are 
estimated.  One full model, then separate models for men and women.  This allows us to 
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identify how different characteristics might have different impacts on an individuals desire for 
income equality according to whether they are male or female. 
 
4.1 Full Model 
The first point of note is that females have a 7.1% higher probability of supporting a fairer 
income distribution than males.  This confirms out univariate findings, although the absolute 
difference of 9.2% is reduced when differences between the personal and labour market 
characteristics of males and females are taken into account.  In contrast, age was not found to 
be important with the notable exception that the over-65s were 4.6% less likely to favour 
income equality than all younger people. 
 
We also observe the entrepreneurial community (small business start-ups and owner-
managers) have lower propensities to support a fairer income distribution.  The magnitude of 
these effects are –3.1% for those starting a new business and –5.3% for owner-managers of 
existing small businesses.  The finding tend to offer support for the 1980s policy thrust by the 
Conservative Party aimed at encouraging self-employment (Greene, 2004) and creating a 
natural bedrock of Conservative voters amongst an expanded small business community, 
traditionally in favour of low taxation.  However, one seemingly perverse finding was that the 
unemployed were 5.7% less likely to favour a more equitable distribution of income than all 
people in other labour market states including the employed. 
 
Education also mattered.  On this we observe that individuals with a degree or higher- level 
degree qualification (Masters and PhD) are the least likely to support fairer income 
distribution.  As we move down the educational ladder below this level we observe increasing 
support for fairer income equality.  For example, A level educated people were 8.7% more 
likely to support income equality.  Those with O levels were 11.1% more likely and those 
with low-level vocational qualifications 14.5% more likely to support income equality. 
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In our initial look at the basic sample statistics, we found that there was tremendous variation 
in support for income equality across ethnic groupings.  Yet once other characteristics are 
taken into account we only find one significant ethnic effect.  On this we find that mixed race 
(white & black African) people are 28.2% less likely, than all other ethnic groups, to support 
a fairer income distribution. 
 
In a similar vein, we initially found substantial difference across different income groups with 
poorer people, generally, more in favour of re-distribution and the very rich substantially less 
so.  Here our estimation highlights significant effects for the very highest income earners.  
The results show that those earning over £100,000 per annum had a 21.1% lower probability 
of supporting a fairer distribution of income than those with median income levels.  That is to 
say that the top 2.3% of the population in terms of income are substantially happier with their 
positions at the extreme right hand side of the income distribution and are the most unwilling 
to support a narrowing in the distribution. 
 
Finally, we observe that people in three regions (countries), Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, have significantly higher propensities of supporting a fairer income distribution.  The 
magnitude of these effects are +5.1%, +3.6% and +6.2% respectively over all other regions.  
Importantly, both Wales and Northern Ireland have elected assemblies (regional parliaments) 
but neither have tax raising or re-distributive powers. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Female Model 
For females, age was not an important determinant of the desire for a fairer income 
distribution.  Being involved in entrepreneurial or small business activity was and had a 
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negative effect on ones desire for a fairer income distribution.  Education was also important 
in that females with post-graduate degrees (Masters or PhD) were significantly less likely 
than all other females to support income equality.  Perhaps surprisingly, first-degree holding 
females were 5.0% more in favour of income equality than their post-graduate holding 
counterparts.  The difference for females with low vocational qualifications compared to post-
graduates is 14.1%. 
 
Only three other effects were apparent for women.  Regarding income, we again identify a 
negative effect for those earning in excess of £100,000 per annum.  The scale of the effect 
implies that the very richest 2.1% of the female population have a 18.3% lower probability of 
supporting a fairer income distribution than women in all other income groups.  The other 
effect is for Black African women who are 25.0% less likely to be in favour of a fairer income 
distribution than women from any other ethnic background.   Women in both Wales (+4.2%) 
and Northern Ireland (+5.0%) also had a higher probability of supporting a fairer income 
distribution. 
 
4.3 Male Model 
For men we do observe an age effect.  On this we note that males between the ages of 55 and 
65 are less likely than any other age group of men to support income equality.  The difference 
is –6.7%.  In line with the female results, we also observe that male entrepreneurs are 
substantially less likely to support income equality, as are business angels (those making 
informal equity investments in unquoted smaller businesses).  In terms of labour market 
status, we note that male part-time workers are less concerned about reducing income 
inequality (-6.9%), as are male unemployed (-11.3%).  In the latter case, this might suggest 
that the male unemployed accept that life is unfair and that they can do little to change things, 
or alternatively that they accept that some working people are getting their just rewards and 
deservedly so. 
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Educational effects were also apparent, but once again different when compared to women.  
Here we note that it is only men with below university level formal qualifications that are 
significantly more likely to support fairer income distribution.  The magnitude of these effects 
varies between 7.9% and 13.5% over all higher levels of male educational qualifications. 
 
We also identify some interesting, and significant, ethnic results.  For example, mixed race 
(white & black Caribbean) males have the lowest propensity for supporting income equality.  
This is in stark contrast with Black Caribbean males who have the highest probability of 
supporting a fairer income distribution (+18.3 compared to our base category of white British 
males) and males of Pakistani origin (+17.2%).  Thus ethnic effects are more apparent for 
males than females. 
 
Regional effects were also identified, and the results are consistent with those identified for 
females.  For males we observe, in descending order of magnitude, the Northern Irish 
(+7.5%), Welsh (+5.9%), and Scots (+5.1%) all had higher probabilities of supporting a fairer 
income distribution than males in any English regions. 
 
Finally we, once again, find that males at the top of the income distribution (>£50,000 per 
annum) have a lower probability of supporting income equality than males at any lower point 
in the male distribution of income.  Yet the actual effect at -24.6% is substantially larger than 
the –18.3% recorded for females. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 
Whilst there is a volume of literature mapping out the evolution, causes and implications of 
income inequality across countries there is much less evidence concerning the desire of 
populations for income equality.  This paper has attempted to shed more light on this latter 
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issue by presenting UK evidence from a large-scale adult population survey for 2003.  It is 
particularly apposite given that the UK has experienced an increase in income and wealth 
inequality compared to other EU member states. 
 
Our findings suggest that it is only the very oldest people in society that have less desire for a 
fairer income distribution.  For the under-55s, teenagers (often claimed to be idealistic) are no 
more supportive of income equality than their parents.  Small business owners (the petit 
bourgeoisie) are less in favour of income equality than the non-entrepreneurial population.  
This is consistent with consecutive government policies (both Conservative and Labour) 
aimed at reducing the tax burden on this section of the population and effectively transferring 
income to this community in return for votes (around 4 million out of an adult population of 
xx million). 
 
Education is also an important determinant of the desire for a fairer distribution of income.  
Broadly we observe that those with the ability, and privilege, to access a university level 
education are significantly less likely to be in favour of income equality.  This is a contentious 
issue at present in the UK.  Broadly, one section of society wants students to pay for their 
education as they reap the private returns in the form of higher wage incomes in the future, 
nicer jobs etc.  The opposing argument centres around the fact that even though society in 
general pays for their education now, we all reap the benefits in terms of higher future taxes, 
and a more productive workforce with all the associated benefits.   This assumes social 
returns are high. 
 
Ethnic effects were also large, although much more important for men than women.  This is a 
particularly interesting aspect of this work as it highlights the fact that recent (post-war) 
immigrants (West Indians and Pakistanis specifically), and their children are, generally, more 
in favour of a fairer distribution of income holding actual income constant.  Thus they are not 
like the stereotypical immigrant to the US who aspires to becoming a millionaire and chases 
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the American dream.  By contrast UK immigrants and their offspring want to assimilate and 
enjoy similar standards of living as their White British counterparts. 
 
We also observe that actual income affects ones propensity to be in favour of a fairer income 
distribution.  There appears to be a cut-off point at around £50,000 per annum income.  
Above this income level, people become substantially less concerned about fairness and 
income equality.  This is generally in line with “happiness” studies which suggest that it is 
relative income, not actual income, that affects an individuals’ happiness.  In this case the 
very rich may well perceive that they are getting the just rewards for their, implicitly superior, 
efforts.  What’s the good of having a Ferrari if everyone’s got one? 
 
Finally, we note that people living in the non-English countries of the UK, Northern Ireland, 
Wales and Scotland are significantly more likely to support a fairer income distribution.  This 
is generally supportive of their desire for more regional political autonomy, and in particular, 
the power to tax and spend. 
 
Thus, to summarise, we have presented detailed evidence from a recent, and large-scale, UK 
adult population survey, concerning the desire of the population for a fairer income 
distribution.  The headline figure is that 75% of the total adult population support a higher 
degree of income equality.  Yet this varies substantially according to gender, education, actual 
income and geography.  This preliminary work opens up several interesting lines of enquiry 
that might be exploited from different perspectives.  For example, psychologists might shed 
more light on why the unemployed still accept and indeed appear to favour inequality.  
Political scientists might explore how a desire for income equality translates into voting 
patterns.  They might also consider why governments have not implemented policies that 
might have stemmed the broadening of income inequality that the UK has experienced in the 
last decade in comparison with our European counterparts.    
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Appendices 
 
Table 1 
Sample Statistics 
 % preferring 
more equal 
income 
distribution 
 % preferring 
more equal 
income 
distribution 
 % preferring 
more equal 
income 
distribution 
Male 80.1 Income £  Ethnicity  
Female 70.9*** <4500 77.7 White British 75.1 
Age  4500 – 6500 83.3 White Irish 81.6 
18-24 76.3 6500 – 7500 81.2 White other 72.7 
25-34 76.1 7500 – 9500 83.8 Mixed (white 
& black 
Caribbean) 
66.7 
35-44 75.8 9500 – 
11500 
87.9 Mixed (white 
& black 
African) 
53.8 
45-54 75.5 11500 – 
13500 
82.7 Mixed (white 
& Asian) 
72.5 
55-64 74.6 13500 – 
15500 
79.1 Mixed other 61.9 
65+ 73.7 15500 – 
17500 
82.0 Indian 73.6 
Starting an 
independent 
67.8 17500 – 
25000 
78.4 Pakistani 81.0 
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business 
Not starting 
an 
independent 
business 
75.9*** 25000 – 
30000 
76.3 Bangladeshi 75.0 
Involved in a 
job related 
business start 
63.6 30000 – 
40000 
72.7 Chinese 75.0 
Not involved 
in job related 
business start 
75.8*** 40000 – 
50000 
70.6 Other Asian 83.3 
Owner-
manager of 
business 
68.2 50000 – 
75000 
64.5 Black 
Caribbean 
86.7 
Not owner-
manager of 
business 
77.0*** 75000 – 
100000 
63.7 Black 
African 
71.2 
Business 
Angel 
67.0 >100k 50.0*** Black other 70.0 
Not business 
angel 
75.6*** Region  Other 77.5*** 
Starting a 
social 
enterprise 
69.7 South West 72.5 Education  
Not starting a 
social 
enterprise 
75.7*** South East 67.3 PhD 57.3 
Owner-
manager of 
social 
enterprise 
67.6 London 70.8 Masters 61.9 
Not owner-
manager of 
social 
enterprise 
76.1*** East 73.0 Degree 66.6 
Labour 
Market 
Status 
 Wales 79.6 A level 76.0 
Full-time 74.0 West 
Midlands 
74.6 O level 79.4 
Part-time 77.9 East 
Midlands 
73.6 High 
Vocational 
79.3 
Inactive 83.3 Yorks & 
Humber 
71.6 Low 
Vocational 
83.1 
Unemployed 74.9 North West 75.8 None 74.1*** 
Retired 70.9 North East 78.0 Job Status  
Student 82.5 Scotland 77.5 Employee 77.4 
Other 77.1*** N.Ireland 81.8*** Self-
employed 
70.6 
Rural 73.7   Manager 64.0*** 
Urban 74.8     
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Table 2 
Probit Models for Desire for Income Equality 
 Full Model Males Females 
 dF/dx z-stat dF/dx z-stat dF/dx z-stat 
Male -0.071 7.67     
Age       
Base=18-24       
25-34 -0.001 0.06 -0.021 0.61 0.002 0.09 
35-44 0.007 0.36 -0.033 0.99 0.021 0.89 
45-54 0.004 0.20 -0.024 0.70 0.013 0.53 
55-64 -0.022 1.03 -0.067 1.86 0.007 0.26 
65+ -0.046 1.69 -0.048 1.10 -0.046 1.33 
       
Starting an 
independent 
business 
-0.031 1.77 -0.006 0.24 -0.061 2.29 
Involved in a 
job related 
business start 
-0.043 1.76 -0.064 1.90 -0.024 0.64 
Owner-
manager of 
business 
-0.053 4.51 -0.078 3.69 -0.041 2.46 
Business 
Angel 
-0.021 0.73 -0.003 1.93 0.054 1.31 
Starting a 
social 
enterprise 
-0.011 0.60 -0.057 0.12 -0.019 0.82 
Owner-
manager of 
social 
enterprise 
-0.024 1.54 -0.069 2.32 0.006 0.31 
Labour 
Market 
Status 
      
Base=Full-
time 
      
Part-time 0.001 0.05 -0.069 2.34 0.019 1.38 
Inactive -0.016 0.73 -0.083 0.54 0.002 0.11 
Unemployed -0.057 2.88 -0.113 3.55 -0.019 0.76 
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Retired -0.063 1.63 -0.078 1.10 -0.041 0.93 
Student -0.038 1.10 -0.057 1.06 -0.025 0.55 
Other -0.047 1.83 -0.056 1.32 -0.047 1.46 
Education       
Base=PhD       
Masters 0.006 0.16 -0.009 0.17 0.016 0.33 
Degree 0.026 0.79 -0.010 0.20 0.050 1.09 
A level 0.087 2.75 0.079 1.66 0.087 1.99 
O level 0.111 3.54 0.115 2.45 0.103 2.32 
High 
Vocational 
0.111 3.59 0.117 2.46 0.098 2.28 
Low 
Vocational 
0.145 4.89 0.135 2.93 0.141 3.52 
None 0.067 1.91 0.035 0.64 0.080 1.72 
Ethnicity       
Base=White 
British 
      
White Irish 0.029 1.38 0.049 1.46 0.017 0.65 
White other -0.029 1.18 -0.013 0.33 -0.039 1.23 
Mixed (white 
& black 
Caribbean) 
-0.068 0.72 -0.402 2.41   
Mixed (white 
& black 
African) 
-0.282 1.75 -0.301 1.27 -0.284 1.27 
Mixed (white 
& Asian) 
-0.092 1.12 -0.127 1.05 -0.076 0.66 
Mixed other -0.046 0.62 -0.087 0.73 -0.006 0.07 
Indian -0.022 0.46 -0.003 0.05 -0.048 0.69 
Pakistani 0.090 1.34 0.172 1.72 0.007 0.07 
Bangladeshi -0.026 0.23 -0.010 0.07 -0.038 0.20 
Chinese -0.043 0.47 0.053 0.34 -0.103 0.90 
Other Asian 0.082 1.06 0.050 0.43 0.100 0.92 
Black 
Caribbean 
0.072 1.15 0.183 1.80 0.006 0.08 
Black 
African 
-0.062 0.98 0.097 1.13 -0.250 2.54 
Black other 0.069 0.55   -0.009 0.06 
Other 0.025 0.77 0.053 1.01 0.008 0.20 
Income £       
Base=<4500       
4500 – 6500 0.048 1.63 0.043 0.80 0.047 1.40 
6500 – 7500 0.029 0.84 0.030 0.48 0.028 0.70 
7500 – 9500 0.053 1.78 0.073 1.38 0.043 1.23 
9500 – 
11500 
0.091 3.36 0.125 2.65 0.075 2.38 
11500 – 
13500 
0.043 1.50 0.043 0.85 0.047 1.44 
13500 – 
15500 
0.008 0.26 -0.003 0.07 0.017 0.49 
15500 – 
17500 
0.047 1.72 0.048 1.01 0.049 1.52 
17500 – 0.003 0.11 -0.004 0.09 0.008 0.26 
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25000 
25000 - 
30000 
-0.006 0.23 -0.008 0.18 -0.007 0.23 
30000 – 
40000 
-0.033 1.22 -0.072 1.49 -0.007 0.21 
40000 – 
50000 
-0.050 1.70 -0.076 1.48 -0.031 0.89 
50000 – 
75000 
-0.088 2.93 -0.122 2.35 -0.061 1.69 
75000 – 
100000 
-0.077 2.04 -0.133 2.09 -0.030 0.66 
>100k -0.211 5.08 -0.246 3.67 -0.183 3.48 
Region       
Base=South 
West 
      
South East -0.035 1.52 -0.063 1.67 -0.012 0.42 
London 0.027 1.23 0.028 0.80 0.024 0.84 
East 0.009 0.38 0.011 0.32 0.007 0.24 
Wales 0.051 2.97 0.059 2.14 0.042 1.98 
West 
Midlands 
0.018 1.19 0.034 1.39 0.007 0.36 
East 
Midlands 
0.010 0.66 -0.012 0.48 0.025 1.29 
Yorks & 
Humber 
0.004 0.19 -0.021 0.56 0.022 0.80 
North West 0.025 1.13 0.033 0.92 0.014 0.50 
North East 0.029 1.28 0.008 0.21 0.041 1.52 
Scotland 0.036 2.12 0.051 1.79 0.026 1.24 
N.Ireland 0.062 3.70 0.075 2.73 0.050 2.41 
       
Log 
Likelihood 
-5185.63  -2514.49  -2630.08  
Pseudo Rsq 0.06  0.07  0.04  
N Obs 10,120  4,527  5,578  
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibiography 
 
Alvarez-Garcia, S, Prieto-Rodriguez, J, Salas, R (2004) The Evolution of Income Inequality 
in the European Union during the Period 1993-1996.  Applied Economics, 36. 1399-1408. 
 
Di Tella, R, MacCulloch, R, Oswald, A (2002) The Macroeconomics of Happiness.  Mimeo: 
Harvard Business School. 
 
Esping-Anderson, G (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.  Polity Press. 
Cambridge. 
 
Fielding, D (2000) Social and Economic Determinants of English Voter Choice in the 1997 
General Election.  Public Choice, 102. 271-295. 
 
Heath, A, Jowell, R, Curtice, J (1985) How Britain Votes. Pergammon. Oxford. 
 
Heath, A, Curtice, J, Jowell, R, Evans, G, Field, J, Witherspoon, S (1991) Understanding 
Political Change. Pergammon. Oxford. 
 
Inglehart, R (1990) Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton University Press. 
 
Jowell, R, Witherspoon, S, Brook, L (1990) British Social Attitudes: the 7th Report. Gower 
Publishing. Aldershot. England. 
 
 24
National Centre for Social Research (2004) British Social Attitudes: the 20th Report. Sage 
Publications. 
 
 
Paxton, W, Dixon, M (2004) The State of the Nation: An Audit of Injustice in the UK.  
Institute for Public Policy Research. London. 
 
Taylor-Gooby, P (1990) Social Welfare: the unkindest of cuts. Ch.1 in Jowell et al (eds) 
British Social Attitudes the 7th Report. 
 
Taylor, B, Thomson, K (1996) Understanding Change in Social Attitudes. Dartmouth 
Publishing. Aldershot, England. 
 
 
